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What comes after neoliberalism? And why does this matter to lawyers? The
backdrop for these questions is Duncan Kennedy’s portrayal of three paradigms
of legal thinking, which successively gained influence across the globe. The first
was classical legal thought, which rose to prominence in the second half of the 19th
century and matched ideas of economic liberalism and laissez-faire. The second
was socially oriented legal thought, which developed from the beginning of the 20th
century and conceived of law as a regulatory instrument to advance social reforms.
The third paradigm, which emerged in the second half of the 20th century, is referred
to as neoformalism and could be termed neoliberalism as well, reflecting the related
turn in economic thinking, law and policy-making.
Whereas the turn to ‘the social’ entailed a politicisation of law and the juridification
of social life, the (re)turn to liberalism was marked by the judicialisation and
constitutionalisation of political claims: privileges or benefits granted by the state
turned into individual rights protected by courts and constitutional authority. At the
same time, neoliberalism is linked with a redefinition of the role of the state through
privatisation, deregulation and new modes of governance, often depicted as soft law,
and underpinned by the new formalism of law & economics.
Mapping the Field
Given ongoing critique and crises of the neoliberal economy, one may indeed
wonder whether a new paradigm is on the rise, which could transform the economic
order, change the function of law, and reshape economic and legal thinking. Of
course, this is largely a political question. In this contribution, I will take a step back
and discuss what is available in academia to shed light on the role of law in the
political economy. Mapping the field is important to gain orientation about alternative
ways of thinking, which translate into different kinds of practice, and helps legal
scholars and professionals understand their role in the game.
The edited volume which this symposium takes off from emphasises the legal
perspective: How does the political economy take shape in the law? How is it
constructed in legal scholarship? I will move beyond legal discourse and offer a fairly
schematic overview of different paradigms within the interdisciplinary field of political
economy. Whether a paradigm shift is pending or whether it is more likely that there
will only be a readjustment in existing patterns of thought can better be assessed by
knowing what is on the menu.
According to Kjaer, political-economic discourse is divided between affirmative and
critical accounts of the economic order. Bartl claims the same for legal discourse:
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overall, “law and legal discourse tend to support, rather than subvert, the tenets
[…] of socio-economic organisation”. This is because law and economics would
already share a certain pre-understanding of how the political economy can and
should be organised and what the respective roles of the market, the state, and the
law should be. Whether or not one shares this dichotomising view, it is important to
notice that economic scholarship harbours different paradigms with different political
implications. Given the dominance of certain ways of thought, so called ‘mainstream
economics’, it is likely that many lawyers will only be acquainted with a specific
perspective and know little about alternatives. However, if the role of law in political
economy is, indeed, a constitutive one, it matters what lawyers and legal scholars
think about the nature of the beast.
Three Functions of Law
In common parlance, law is often equated with regulation, or state intervention.
In neoclassical economics, such intervention is only justified in cases of market
failure. However, how do markets come into being in the first place? Economists
know as much as lawyers that law also has an enabling function. Economic activity
rests on legal support structures (or some functional equivalent). Ordoliberalism
envisions a private law society framed by competition law. A third dimension of law
is, perhaps, more acknowledged by lawyers than economists and also relevant to
socio-legal and socio-economic scholarship: the constitutive function of law, which is
coextensive with its facilitative and restrictive functions. Edelman and Stryker refer to
the legal “concepts, definitional categories, labels, and ideas that play a subtle and
often invisible role in how economic actors […] come into existence, organize their
activities and relationships, and arrange their governance”. Law provides a cognitive
infrastructure for how we conceive of economic activity; it defines and constitutes
possible subjects, objects, and terms of transaction. These categories are usually
taken for granted, and it becomes hard to think ‘outside the box’.
In his contribution to the volume, David Kennedy lists “credit, property, money,
capital, labour, citizenship, sovereignty” as examples. Most of these legal fictions
are already shaped by economic thinking, or some interaction between law
and economics. Kennedy highlights the work of “globally oriented legal élites”
in “developing the philosophical, doctrinal and institutional tools that strategic
actors use every day around the world to pursue their interests”. This perspective
complements an earlier study of how the international political economy is conceived
in different legal disciplines, which all have their blind spots and biases. For the turn
of the 21st century, Kennedy speaks of “a grab bag of diverse ideas about what
law is and how it functions”. Accordingly, law could be mobilised for anything, but
not everybody has access to the expertise and leverage of legal élites. The global
economic order is not neutral but, in many ways, partial and unjust.
Critical and Self-Reflective
In line with the tenor of the edited volume and the majority of its contributors, I want
to emphasise the need for a more independent angle in legal scholarship, which
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is informed by social theory and the sociology of knowledge and helps to put both
law and economics into perspective: as professional practices and as scholarly
disciplines. To use a little bit of jargon, what is needed is a critical and self-reflective
point of view, from which the knowledge-claims of different paradigms or disciplines
can be assessed in comparison to each other and with regard to their normative
implications. My focus is on the science of political economy, which has to be carved
out first.
Political economy is ambivalent as a term, and one cannot immediately recognise
whether it refers to a sphere of reality or to an analytical perspective. Elsewhere,
the distinction seems clear: economics is a discipline whose subject matter is the
economy. Political science aims at polity/politics/policy, sociology at ‘the social’.
In contrast, political economy is both a field of intersections between economic
and political institutions, processes, and actors, and a discipline interested in this
subject matter. But this is not all about it. Some would argue that it is not the subject
matter that defines a discipline but its methodology. Accordingly, it is the economic
approach – to everything – that characterises economics. This is usually equated
with the rational choice model or the concept of utility maximisation. Against this
backdrop, political economy could either be understood as an extension of the
economic approach to matters of politics or as an alternative to the economic
approach that is richer in political analysis, e.g., regarding relations of power.
States and Markets
Political economy has a long pedigree. The concept was coined in the 17th century
to describe the interplay of the government and the economy. It gained prominence
in times of mercantilism, but it is still better known for its subsequent use in classical
and critical political economy. Classical political economy promoted liberal principles
for ‘the wealth of nations’ and thus paved the way for the modern discipline of
economics. In contrast, critical political economy brought relations of power and
inequality to the fore to account for the negative repercussions of the industrial
revolution. In the 20th century, the attribute of the political lost importance in the
definition of the economic discipline. In neoclassical economics, the role of the
state is effectively sidelined. Some basic functions are taken as given to ensure the
workings of the markets. In recent decades, political economy became a popular
label for all kinds of enquiry compensating for this negligence. But it remains a
heterogenous field with different research orientations.
A major distinction that helps structuring the field is between political economy as
an extension of the economic approach and political economy as a subject matter
characterised by interactions of states and markets. The first category includes all
research that adapts the rational choice approach, or models of utility maximisation,
to issues of the state, politics, and the law, or the ordering of the economy more
specifically. The second category gathers research that considers the interaction of
states and markets as constitutive of the economic order, yet as changeable and
contentious, which makes it a subject matter in its own right.
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Different Starting Points
Following a distinction relevant to causal explanations, legal institutions can be
conceived as dependent or independent variable. In the economic approach, law is
understood as the result of individual decision-making, strategic interaction, and the
aggregation of interests of actors of different kind: voters, politicians, stakeholders
etc. In this context, law is considered as a dependent variable. At the same time,
law can also be considered as an independent variable. This is the case when
it is conceived as enabling or restrictive condition for economic activities, which
ideally promotes economic growth but may also hinder it. Sometimes, law is being
‘naturalised’, suggesting that property, morality, and punishment are universal or
innate. Here, liberal thinking merges with behavioural and evolutionary approaches.
Accordingly, law is rooted in human nature and reflects the natural propensities of
our species, even though it is obviously also culturally reinforced.
In a range of other approaches that go beyond rational choice and its institutional
and behavioural extensions, the focus is on how states and markets interact in
different historical and cultural contexts. This includes comparative perspectives from
sociology and political science but also some schools of economic thought outside
mainstream economics. While one may still analytically distinguish between law as a
dependent and an independent variable, a core insight of this more pluralistic field of
scholarship is the mutual constitution of the economy and its polity. Emphasis is put
on the intertwinement of economic, political, and legal factors in institutionalising the
modern capitalist system, in accounting for its different national or regional varieties,
and in explaining its development over time, be it over decades or centuries. This
brings the contingency and changeability of economic order to the fore. In such
approaches, little is simply considered as natural, or given.
Now, let us put some labels on the two different starting points. Research in the
first category includes neoclassical economics, neoclassical law & economics
(economic analysis of law), and new institutional economics (rational-choice based
institutionalism). In addition, one can list strands of behavioural, experimental, and
evolutionary economics as well as law & neuroscience, inasmuch they emphasise
nature over culture and dwell on presumably universal moral intuitions. Research in
the second category includes old institutional economics (original institutionalism)
and the first law & economics movement as well as the continuation of both
in modern institutionalism and institutional law & economics. Moreover, it also
encompasses socio-legal and critical-legal scholarship inasmuch as it extends to the
economy, comparative, critical and cultural political economy inasmuch it extends to
the law, law & socioeconomics, and the economic sociology of law.
Why It Matters
Why does it matter which paradigm or approach one chooses to discuss the law
of political economy? For many economists, law provides a neutral framework that
creates predictability for economic actors, while everything else is taken as given
(e.g., the initial distribution of resources). What they miss out is that law also serves
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as a cognitive infrastructure that reflects the historical, political and cultural contexts
in which it developed, that shapes our ways of thinking about political-economic
issues, about what is right and wrong, good or bad policy, and that makes us take
certain concepts and ideas for granted, as if they were facts out there, and forget
about alternative possibilities to conceive of economic and social relations. To be
able to recognise the biases inherent to the law, its implications for the definition
of problems and the range of imaginable solutions requires, if not a paradigm shift,
so at least the ability to switch between paradigms, that is, not only to consider
approaches in the first category above but also the second one.
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